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TAGS: [OSCE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [SP](#) [KV](#) [CU](#)
SUBJECT: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S OCTOBER 15 MEETING
WITH SPANISH FM MORATINOS

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION HUGO LLORENS; REASON: 1.5(B) and
(D)

11. (C) Summary: A/S Fried and CDA Llorens met October 15 with Spanish FM Miguel Angel Moratinos. A/S Fried briefed Moratinos on 2 2 talks on CFE and missile defense, including the possibility of major progress on CFE in time for the OSCE ministerial Spain is hosting in November. A/S Fried prepared Moratinos for the next steps in Kosovo, and although Moratinos clearly continues to hope for an agreed solution, he said Spain would "support EU consensus" on the issue should the Troika fail. On Iran, Moratinos said Spain was supporting the French and UK approach. Moratinos offered whatever help Spain could provide on the upcoming Middle East peace conference. On Cuba, he insisted to a skeptical A/S Fried that Spain,s engagement with the regime could help promote democratic transition. Finally, Moratinos reiterated his interest in meeting with the Secretary sometime before the OSCE ministerial. End summary.

CFE and Missile Defense

12. (C) A/S Fried briefed Moratinos on the October 12-13 U.S.-Russian 2 2 Ministerial. He explained that the U.S. had presented the Russians with a creative proposal on CFE that went beyond the parallel action paper. He said the proposal included a number of ideas for additional steps on Georgia and Moldova. He cautioned that there was still much to be done. These ideas had yet to be discussed in detail with the Georgians and the Moldovans, although that would happen quickly. A/S Fried said he was headed from Madrid to Brussels to brief NATO Permanent Representatives. He noted the U.S. was waiting for the Russian response and warned the initial positive Russian reaction could change. Nevertheless, he wanted Moratinos to be aware of the details since if all went well, this could have a profound and positive impact on the OSCE ministerial Spain will host at the end of November.

13. (C) Moratinos was quick to grasp the potential benefit to Spain, the OSCE Chairman in Office, of such a positive turn of events, and to offer Spanish support with Moldova and Georgia. He mentioned that he had visited Moldova and Transnistria and had discussed the issue with Russian FM Lavrov (he mentioned that he had a testy meeting with a gloomy Igor Smirnov in which he finally told Smirnov that he was not going to stay and waste time with him. According to an amused Moratinos, that broke the ice and they then had a substantive conversation.) Moratinos offered to send Spain,s envoy on Georgia there if the U.S. thought it could be helpful.

¶4. (C) A/S Fried described the "joint regional architecture proposals" on missile defense that had been shared with the Russians in Moscow. He noted that the Russians seemed to have been taken off balance by the forthcoming nature of this proposal and not ready to respond other than to acknowledge that this was a constructive offer. He emphasized that the U.S. was being flexible and trying to include the Russians in a cooperative MD system to the extent practicable.

Kosovo

¶5. (C) A/S Fried said the U.S. supported the Troika effort but that everyone had to recognize what was likely to happen after December 10 and prepare for it. He stressed that Europe and the U.S. needed to continue to support Kosovo post-independence. Walking away would be disastrous. A way must be found, for example, to continue the OSCE mission functions there, perhaps under another (UN or EU) umbrella. A/S Fried explained that French, German, Italian, British, and American lawyers had looked carefully at UNSCR 1244 and concluded that it was not inconsistent with independence and would continue to provide a mandate for the NATO and EU presence in Kosovo even after independence. Javier Solana had expressed the same view at the Secretary's "Transatlantic dinner" with EU foreign ministers in New York during the UNGA. Moratinos said Spain had not lost hope for the Troika process. He noted that a Kosovar declaration of independence and the absence of a new UNSCR would make things difficult for Spain and Europe. A/S Fried cautioned against hoping for a miracle while failing to prepare for what was most likely to happen. He emphasized that the U.S. looked for Spain's support as OSCE CIO. Moratinos said Spain would not "create problems" for the U.S. or EU on Kosovo, and Spain would fall in line with EU consensus. However, he cautioned that Cyprus

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might stand the way of EU consensus. He said a creative approach would have to be found to deal with the Cypriots.

Iran

¶6. (C) Moratinos said Spain was backing France and the UK on Iran. He noted the Spanish mission in Brussels had issued a statement in support of their position. Spain supported dialogue but also sanctions if dialogue failed. Moratinos said a UNSCR would be best, but if Russia and China made that impossible, then a united stand by Europe and the U.S. was the next best thing. He said we needed more sticks and more carrots with Iran.

MEPP

¶7. (C) Moratinos said Spain hoped the U.S. conference would be successful and that Spain was ready to use its good offices to support the effort. He mentioned that Spain had good contacts with the Palestinians and would be willing to approach them if the U.S. thought it could help.

Cuba

¶8. (C) While noting that both countries expressed their support for a democratic Cuba, A/S Fried said the U.S. disagreed profoundly with Spain's approach. He stressed that Spain needed to be careful lest it inadvertently facilitate a transition from one dictator to another. He urged that Spain reach out openly to the dissidents. Moratinos replied that he had spoken publicly and privately during the Secretary's June visit of Spain's support for democracy in Cuba. He claimed the differences with the U.S. were tactical but that our approaches could be complementary. He said Spain sought to encourage those within the regime

who wanted transition. He said the transition was already underway and that all power had passed from Fidel to Raul Castro. He asserted that there were some in Raul's circle who at least wanted to begin to open the economy, and Spain wanted to help them. He said Spain was supporting human rights and democracy in Cuba and did not want to cause the U.S. problems there. He urged that Spain and the U.S. maintain a constant dialogue on Cuba. A/S Fried agreed to dialogue but urged that Spain maintain a principled position.

Appointment with Secretary

¶9. (C) Moratinos said he hoped for a half hour appointment with the Secretary in Washington sometime before the November 29-30 OSCE ministerial. A/S Fried replied that would try. (Note: Embassy Madrid has discussed various options with Moratinos, Chief of Staff, and it appears November 6-7 is the best window. End note.)

¶10. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable.
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